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Abstract—How should technology entrepreneurs allocate their time to potential customers? Considering 
two important dynamics that influence consumers’ purchase decisions regarding new technology products, 
namely, consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction, we study the tactical-level time allocation decision 
with a simple game-theoretic model. We offer an economic rationale for the entrepreneur’s optimal time 
allocation for different levels of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction as well as different revenue 
distributions between the buyers, and we discuss theoretical and practical implications for technology 
entrepreneurship. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
New technology startups have surged in recent decades. Such startups often develop new, superior 
technology-based products capable of replacing the products of established firms that operate in similar 
domains. For these technology startups, it is vital to achieve success in the initial sales in the early stages of 
market entry; this helps the cash-constrained technology entrepreneur not only to survive (i.e., to attain a 
positive cash flow), but also to establish the necessary reputation for attracting the additional funding that is 
needed to grow. Indeed, one of the most common reasons for new venture failure, according to existing 
research, is the inability to effectively bring products to potential consumers [1]. 
Unsurprisingly, in a recent survey on new ventures, selling was identified by early-stage angel and venture 
capital investors as one of the three most critical business operations that entrepreneurs were least competent 
in executing [2]. Indeed, despite their technological expertise [3], many innovators have little experience in 
selling their products [2, 4] and are thus led to ask: “I have a great product, now how to sell it?” [5]. 
 One of the key components of a new venture’s selling activity is the entrepreneur’s offering a vast number 
of potential customers a personal explanation of the benefits of its new product relative to existing ones [6]. 
In observational studies, startup entrepreneurs were often found “drafting their product leaflet and acquiring 
customers with numerous calls, emails, and sales pitches” [7]. This selling process presents a challenge for 
many technology entrepreneurs because of the combination of shortages they face in resources, reputation, 
and routine [8]. 
First, entrepreneurs lack sales resources. In the early stages of selling, typically the entrepreneur is the only 
person who is knowledgeable (and passionate) enough about the new product to successfully engage potential 
customers [9], so it is difficult to outsource this activity. The greater the number of potential customers an 
entrepreneur can personally engage with, the higher the expected sales. However, entrepreneurs cannot 
engage with all potential customers, and investing more time in one client necessarily means spending less 
time with another. Thus, the entrepreneur’s time is a critical resource for selling, and its shortage can 
significantly threaten a product’s sales. 
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Second, entrepreneurs often lack credible reputations, which causes potential customers to doubt their 
product’s quality. Thus, even when considering a product with a clear superior value proposition, consumers 
will require significant effort from the entrepreneur before they adopt it. Entrepreneurs’ reputations will grow 
as they sell more of their product, which in turn will make selling easier. However, in the early stages of 
selling, this shortage can pose a significant threat to sales success. 
Finally, entrepreneurial firms lack established routines or processes because they are evolving 
organizations without codified work processes or assigned roles. For the selling process, this means that there 
are no established sales channels or previous customers that the firm can rely on. Instead, new relationships 
with sales channels and/or customers must be forged. The lack of established sales routines also makes the 
early stages of selling challenging for technology entrepreneurs. 
In addition to these shortages, there are two key dynamics present in the market place that can potentially 
threaten the entrepreneur’s product from reaching its commercial potential. These are embodied in the 
following example of a technology entrepreneur embarking on the selling process:1  
The entrepreneur had successfully developed a prototype of an ultra-light, foldable, and chainless electric 
bike suitable for inner-city commutes. Since he had already secured some initial funding and taken 
advantage of his personal contacts and consequently had manufacturing capability in Eastern Europe, the 
entrepreneur’s major concern was how to market the electric bikes in a large European city. Specifically, 
he wondered whether he should focus his time on selling to possibly influential consumers (e.g., young 
professionals and/or local municipalities in central-city areas) who could serve as free advertising to other 
potential customers, or whether he should take a more bottom-up approach. Additionally, how would 
existing electric bike manufacturers respond in the short term (e.g., by offering extended warranties), and 
how should the entrepreneur reassess his selling strategy to reflect any such responses? 
 
The first dynamic is consumer peer learning, which has been widely studied from a theoretical perspective 
[10] and observed in a variety of contexts [11, 12]. Although the product developed by the entrepreneur was 
highly innovative and arguably superior to what the market currently offered by virtue of being foldable and 
 
1  This illustrative example comes from a real entrepreneur who participated in a technology entrepreneurship 
program at our institution and with whom we had extensive discussions during the early stages of our research project. 
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chainless, consumers would still have doubts about the product’s superior value.  When a purchase decision 
involves uncertainty, consumers often rely on the purchases made by others [13-15]. The second dynamic is 
incumbent reaction, whereby incumbent firms employ a defensive strategy or other competitive responses to 
retain their customers [16, 17]. Because the new product was highly innovative and used a new technology, 
incumbents could not quickly develop a competing product of equal caliber in the short term. However, an 
incumbent firm might try a short-term strategy to deter the new entrant, e.g., by offering additional service 
or by lowering the prices of its existing products to enhance its customers’ utility or surplus [18-20].  
Our focus is on technology entrepreneurs (such as the one in the example) who have developed a 
functioning product or service and are embarking on the early stages of selling. We do not consider, for 
instance, technology entrepreneurs in the initial stages of development aiming at achieving certain milestones 
(e.g., FDA approval in the bio-tech industry). Moreover, we focus on settings where entrepreneurs are trying 
to demonstrate the viability of their new products in the market by generating initial sales. Thus, we do not 
consider technology entrepreneurs who can leverage past product sales records to partner with investors or 
outsource their sales activity. For the entrepreneurs we study, whether the opportunity presented by a 
promising product can be realized hinges on the entrepreneur’s ability to manage the aforementioned 
shortages in resources, reputation, and routines and convert potential threats such as the incumbent reaction 
into opportunities during the early selling phase.  
This paper aims to understand how entrepreneurs can achieve success in the early selling phase through 
the time allocation decisions they make. The key bottleneck resource for new ventures is often the 
entrepreneurs themselves, and how they allocate their time will therefore directly determine the firm’s 
revenue, speed of growth, and ultimate size [21-23].  In particular, we address the following question: How 
should technology entrepreneurs allocate their limited time to potential consumers in order to maximize their 
short-term sales opportunities, given the two market dynamics of incumbent reaction and consumer peer 
learning? Put differently, how can an entrepreneur transform potential threats from incumbent reaction and 
opportunities from consumer peer learning into greater sales, given the significant time shortage?  
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To answer this question, we employ a mathematical model. We consider a stylized market consisting of 
two buyers (or two customer segments), each representing a different revenue amount upon a successful sale. 
The sales process is inherently uncertain, but the probability of a sale for each buyer increases with the 
amount of time the entrepreneur invests in selling to that buyer. Thus, we characterize entrepreneurial selling 
as an operational process that transforms the input of time into the output of expected sales. Our stylized 
market also incorporates the two market dynamics that offer opportunities/threats: (i) an influential (e.g., 
more visible) buyer’s purchase decision can impact the purchase decision of a non-influential (e.g., less 
visible) buyer, and (ii) the incumbent can potentially react to retain its customers and lower the entrepreneur’s 
chance of acquiring them. We investigate the optimal time allocation to maximize the entrepreneur’s 
expected sales in the presence of consumer peer learning and/or incumbent reaction, studying the effect of 
each market dynamic separately as well as their interaction on the entrepreneur’s optimal time allocation 
decision. 
Our analysis reveals that the presence of consumer peer learning, when it is considered independently, 
encourages the entrepreneur to invest more selling time in the influential buyer to take advantage of the free 
advertising—indeed, entrepreneurs may prefer to invest more time in selling to influential buyers than to 
non-influential buyers even if selling to the former means negative revenue. Our analysis also reveals that 
the presence of incumbent reaction, when considered independently, encourages the entrepreneur to invest 
more selling time in the buyer who represents smaller revenue. Attempting to acquire the larger buyer is 
inefficient because the incumbent seeks to retain that buyer. When the two effects are considered together, 
we find that the market dynamics of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction interact to present a non-
monotonic relationship between sales time and expected sales. Specifically, entrepreneurs should focus their 
selling time on influential buyers when they represent either relatively small revenue or larger revenue than 
non-influential buyers. However, when an influential buyer represents slightly smaller revenue than a non-
influential buyer, entrepreneurs should instead focus their sales time on the non-influential buyer.  
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The intuition behind the results when both dynamics are present is as follows. If the influential buyer 
represents small revenue compared to the non-influential one, the incumbent firm will seek to retain the larger 
non-influential buyer. In such a case, it is highly desirable for the entrepreneur to invest selling time in the 
small influential buyer, both to avoid direct competition with the incumbent and to take advantage of 
consumer peer learning. If the influential buyer represents larger revenue than the non-influential buyer, the 
entrepreneur should increase the selling time given to the larger influential buyer despite the incumbent’s 
reaction aimed at retaining the buyer. This is because the prospect of acquiring larger revenue and free 
advertising offsets the reduced probability of a successful sale which is caused by the incumbent’s reaction. 
When the influential buyer represents similar but smaller revenue than the non-influential buyer, the 
incumbent firm will react to retain the influential buyer in order to take advantage of consumer peer learning. 
In this case, the reduced revenue prospect and probability of success caused by the incumbent reaction offsets 
the potential gain from free advertising, making it less desirable to invest time in the smaller influential buyer. 
Thus, the entrepreneur should increase the selling time given to the non-influential buyer. 
Our results demonstrate that for the entrepreneur, despite presentation of an objectively superior product 
to the market, the shortages and potential opportunities/threats make it less straightforward for the 
entrepreneur to monetize that product. For example, without considering the potential reaction of the 
incumbent, entrepreneurs may be tempted to focus their sales effort on the influential customer segment to 
take advantage of their free advertising. However, this could lead to the trap of “punching above their weight” 
and result in a reduced chance of success in initial sales, thus undermining the opportunity offered by the 
superior product. The size of the opportunity for a technology entrepreneur is inherently influenced by the 
market dynamics of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction. By recognizing their shortages and 
managing opportunities and threats through informed decisions, entrepreneurs must shape their own 
opportunities.  
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II. RELATED LITERATURE 
The entrepreneurship literature has highlighted the significant amount of time that entrepreneurs devote to 
sales. In a time allocation survey of early-growth stage entrepreneurs, one study has observed that 
entrepreneurs spend 38% of their time, the highest percentage for any activity, on direct selling and customer 
contact [24]. A recent study of entrepreneurs’ everyday behavior has also observed similar patterns, with 
31% of startup entrepreneurs’ working time spent on communicating with external partners [7]. Building on 
these observations, we formalize the entrepreneur’s time allocation decision when selling in order to study 
how entrepreneurs should allocate their limited time to potential customers to maximize expected sales. 
Entrepreneurs are often cited as an organization’s main bottleneck resource, and their time allocation 
decisions directly determine the firm’s revenue, speed of growth, and ultimate size [21-23].  Accordingly, a 
large amount of literature dating back to the models in [25] and [26] has focused on entrepreneurs’ time 
allocation decisions. Several studies examine how entrepreneurs allocate their time between the waged job, 
new ventures, and leisure via analytical [27], empirical [24, 28], and experimental [29, 30] approaches. The 
study in [22] examines how entrepreneurs should allocate their time to process improvement in order to better 
manage growth. Although these studies have enhanced our understanding of the intertemporal time allocation 
decisions of the entrepreneur, we believe that, considering the fact that technology entrepreneurs spend a 
considerable amount of their precious time solely on selling efforts [7, 24], time allocation for selling 
warrants specific attention. Consequently, this paper extends the literature on the entrepreneur’s time 
allocation strategy by focusing on time spent on selling during entrepreneurial selling cycles, an important 
but understudied phenomenon in this domain.  
In our study of the time allocation of entrepreneurs, we incorporate two critical potential 
opportunities/threats when selling new technology—peer influence via consumers’ purchase behavior and 
competitive reactions by the incumbent firm—in a game-theoretic framework. The impact of consumer peer 
learning, which describes consumer herding behavior [10], as well as how firms should adjust their strategies 
in its presence have been widely studied in the context of established firms. For example, [31] examines the 
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incumbent firm’s intertemporal decision regarding whether to explore a new technology or exploit an 
established technology in the presence of consumer peer effects. Others have examined the role of consumer 
peer learning in influencing decisions such as those involving pricing [32, 33] and product launch timing 
[34]. However, it is unclear whether such findings in large firm settings generalize and apply to 
entrepreneurial selling where there are limited resources. Compared to large firms, entrepreneurial firms may 
have severely limited resources (e.g., time) for pursuing influential buyers in the first place; yet product 
purchases by influential buyers could be immensely helpful for entrepreneurs. In the context of 
entrepreneurial selling, where the seller lacks an established reputation, consumer peer learning arguably 
plays a more prominent role since an influential customer’s purchase of a new product can compensate for 
the lack of reputation. Consequently, the present study focuses on how consumer peer learning provides a 
unique opportunity during the entrepreneurial selling process that is unlike the role it plays in the case of 
established firms.  
Our study is also related to the literature on competitive market entry and incumbent reactions. Extensive 
research has addressed competitive responses and defensive marketing strategies [35-37]. A primary concern 
in this literature is the identification and examination of a variety of factors that could affect the likelihood 
and intensity of competitor responses [38-40]. These studies provide insights about the notion of competitive 
market entry, but their focus is mainly on large, established firms in traditional market contexts. Only recently 
have researchers begun to devote sustained attention to competitive strategies for entrepreneurial firms [41]; 
these include, inter alia, the timing of market entry [42, 43], entrepreneurial risk [44], integration into 
complementary technologies [45], and pre-entry resources [46]. Entrepreneurs may also be more selective 
about their actions and therefore less likely to engage in costly and frequent competitive moves [41]. Our 
paper complements this stream of research by examining asymmetric strategy sets for the entrepreneur and 
the incumbent in competing for customers. In addition, while this stream of research is primarily concerned 
with exploitative and exploratory moves in competition [41], our work incorporates consumer peer learning 
and investigates the implications of the interplay between competition and peer learning.   
9 
 
III. MODEL SETUP 
We consider a stylized market consisting of two rational consumers (Buyer 1 and Buyer 2) representing 
different levels of revenue ( 1R  and 2R , respectively) and peer influence. Alternatively, Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 
can be interpreted as two distinct consumer groups, with 1R  and 2R  representing the collective revenue 
derived from each. While 1R  and 2R  are exogenously given, it is uncertain whether the entrepreneur can 
capture those revenues. Thus, the entrepreneur is interested in the expected revenues ][ 1RE  and ][ 2RE , 
which are increasing in the sales efforts 1n  and 2n directed to Buyer 1 and Buyer 2, respectively.  
Both of the buyers are customers of the incumbent firm, which may react to the entrepreneur’s market entry 
by providing these customers with added benefits 1k  and 2k  aimed at retaining Buyer 1 and Buyer 2, 
respectively. The scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.  
The technology entrepreneur is equipped with a superior substitutable product or a service (hereafter, 
simply “product”). In order to focus on the entrepreneur’s time allocation decision, we assume vertically 
differentiated products characterized by exogenous parameters γ and λ representing the value propositions of 
the entrepreneur’s and the incumbent’s product, respectively. Thus, when making a purchase decision, each 
consumer compares the value proposition of the entrepreneur’s product (γ) with that of the incumbent’s 
product (λ) (see, for example, [47, 48]). 
 
Fig. 1.  Entrepreneur’s time allocation problem with (i) consumer peer learning and (ii) incumbent reaction.  
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The entrepreneur’s product is superior (γ > λ), due to either higher quality at a similar price or similar 
quality at a lower price. For example, an entrepreneur might offer a higher-performing algorithm at the 
prevailing price point or a less expensive data storage system with the latest levels of capacity and 
functionality. However, unlike the incumbent firm’s product quality λ, which is known to the buyers, the 
entrepreneur’s product quality γ is unknown.  
To make a successful sale, the entrepreneur must invest time (in the form of meetings, phone calls, etc.) to 
help potential buyers learn about the new product’s superior value. The process of selling entails high 
uncertainty, and thus the time invested may not result in a sale. To capture the randomness, we model the 
selling process via a “sampling” process, where the entrepreneur’s allocated time is represented by the 
amount of information (samples of the product value) provided to each buyer. Specifically, when the 
entrepreneur directs in  units of time (e.g., number of hours) to Buyer i, Buyer i observes the samples, 
,, 21 XX …, i
n
X ,  which are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean γ and variance .2  
This variance term can be considered as the effect of reputation, with larger variance indicating smaller 
reputation—that is, consumers will interpret the entrepreneur’s sales messages in a more mixed manner if 
the entrepreneur lacks a credible reputation.   
Based on the information given, buyers form their beliefs about the new product’s value proposition. The 
distribution of the sample mean will be a normal distribution due to the central limit theorem, so if the 
entrepreneur decides to exert a sample size of in  units of time, Buyer i’s belief about the product value is a 
random quantity ),(~ˆ
2
1=
ii
ji
n
j
i
nn
X 
 N 

 . Buyer i will purchase from the entrepreneur if and only if Buyer i is 
convinced that the expected product value exceeds the value derived from the incumbent’s product, i.e.,
.>ˆ  i  The probability of a purchase by Buyer i after being given in samples is therefore  
),(=)|>ˆ( iii nnP




  
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where )( is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Thus, when the 
entrepreneur devotes more time (larger in ) to Buyer i, the buyer’s belief regarding the quality iˆ  will 
approach the true quality γ as its variance decreases. In other words, reducing uncertainty about the product 
quality improves the entrepreneur’s chance of completing a sale; however, it does not guarantee it. 
The term  )/(   represents how easy it is to acquire a buyer. The larger the value of this fraction, the 
easier it is for the entrepreneur to convince Buyer i. We shall use the symbol  )/(   where needed, for 
simplicity of expression.  
The entrepreneur seeks to maximize the expected revenue by optimally allocating efforts 1n  and 2n  to 
Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 in an attempt to realize revenues 1R  and 2R from them. Because the entrepreneur’s 
time is limited, i.e., Nnn  21  for some N, the entrepreneur’s Time Allocation Problem (TAP) is  
.)|>ˆ(=max
2,1, 21
ii
i
i
nn
nPRE  

E  
The entrepreneur’s TAP is complicated by two effects, consumer peer learning and the incumbent’s 
response, which we formally examine in the rest of this section. The sequence of events is summarized in 
Figure 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Sequence of events. The dotted elements signify possible actions of the incumbent or consumers. 
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A. Consumer Peer Learning 
We assume that the two buyers have different levels of peer influence. In this case, a purchase by the more 
influential buyer (Buyer 1) may well prompt the other, non-influential, buyer (Buyer 2) to also decide to 
purchase. In other words, a sale to the more influential buyer makes a sale to the non-influential buyer more 
likely. 
Suppose that the entrepreneur-provided information 1n  convinces Buyer 1 to buy the new product. Then 
the more influential Buyer 1’s act of purchasing affects Buyer 2’s purchase decision. We model this consumer 
peer learning as Buyer 2 inferring Buyer 1’s information and using it—along with its own information 2n
supplied by the entrepreneur—to update its beliefs about the new product.2  Thus, a purchase from the 
entrepreneur by Buyer 1 may prompt Buyer 2 to make a purchase even if Buyer 2 would not have purchased 
when taking only its own information about the product into account. The information inferred may be partial; 
however, for simplicity, we assume—as in [49]—that the information is complete. 
  In the presence of consumer peer learning, Buyer 2’s belief about the product value proposition depends 
on whether or not Buyer 1 has purchased, as follows: 

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so the purchase probability for Buyer 2 becomes 
 
2 We do not focus on the seemingly analogous case in which Buyer 1’s decision not to purchase from the entrepreneur makes it 
less likely that Buyer 2 does so. The reason is that the influential buyer’s decision not to purchase is less observable than an actual 
purchase. Furthermore, entrepreneurs actively advertise their successful cases (e.g., by listing customers on their websites) but 
have no motivation to publicly acknowledge unsuccessful ones. 
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B. Incumbent Reaction 
As the entrepreneur attempts to acquire buyers, the incumbent may react in order to retain its customers. 
Because we focus on short-term strategies, the incumbent’s possible reaction is limited to a marginal increase 
in its product value proposition through additional benefits or a reduced price. Specifically, the incumbent 
can provide an additional benefit ik  to buyer i to enhance the product value proposition (e.g., loyalty 
benefits, reimbursement, extra service, better after-sales technical support, or selective price markdowns). 
The likelihood of Buyer i not buying from the entrepreneur is  
).|<ˆ( ii nkP   
Clearly, this expression is increasing with ik . 
The incumbent also has limited short-term resources that can be used for buyer retention, so Kkk  21  
for some K; if the incumbent had unlimited resources, the entrepreneur would have no chance of succeeding 
in the market and should therefore refrain from entering it. This constraint creates a trade-off for the 
incumbent firm in its decision, which is aimed at increasing the likelihood of retaining customers and 
maximizing its expected revenue 
IE . The incumbent firm’s optimal response to the entrepreneur’s time 
allocation strategy ( 21, nn )  involves solving the Incumbent Reaction Problem (IRP):   
)|kˆ(=max i
2,1, 21
ii
i
i
kk
nPRE 

 I  
    A distinctive feature of the customer acquisition/retention game modeled here is that the entrepreneur and 
the incumbent implement asymmetric strategy sets. The entrepreneur strives to reduce customers’ uncertainty 
(the variance of their belief about the product’s value proposition) by allocating time to educate them about 
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the new product’s superiority. The incumbent, on the other hand, tries to marginally increase its product value 
proposition (shift the distribution) by adding services (or lowering prices), which is intended to deter the 
entrepreneur from selling its product. 
We shall assume that neither the entrepreneur nor the incumbent has sufficient time/resources to induce 
purchasing by both buyers: 
Assumption 1. (i) ;)/(
22  N   (ii)   .<  K  
This assumption allows us to focus on our setting of interest, namely, the setting in which the entrepreneur 
and the incumbent must each make a decision involving a trade-off. Specifically, part (i) ensures that the 
entrepreneur does not have enough time (N) to significantly increase the purchase probability of both buyers 
(either because the entrepreneur’s reputation is low, i.e., the value of σ is high, or because the level of 
superiority of the entrepreneur’s product is low, i.e., ）（    is small), so that the entrepreneur needs to decide 
how best to allocate its time, while part (ii) guarantees that the incumbent cannot match the superior quality 
of the entrepreneur’s new product by providing additional benefits to the buyers, since otherwise the 
entrepreneur would not have any opportunity to make a sale in the market. 
 Considering that the resource constraint is always binding (it is rational for the entrepreneur and the 
incumbent to use all the resources that they have: Nnn =21   and Kkk =21  ), we can then characterize 
the allocation decision in terms of a single decision variable. We adopt the convention of focusing on the 
resources allocated to (the more influential) Buyer 1—that is, on 1n and 1k . We treat 1n and 1k as continuous 
variables when solving for the optimal effort and resource allocation strategies, in line with the conventional 
practice in the modeling literature (see, e.g., [50]). 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In our analysis, we analyze four types of markets, based on the presence or absence of consumer peer 
learning and incumbent reactions. By analyzing the optimal time allocation strategy for each scenario, our 
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framework helps us understand the influence of each dynamic independently as well as the interaction 
between the two dynamics by providing an economic rationale. 
We use the superscripts ‘*L’, ‘*R’, and ‘*LR’ to signify (respectively) the optimal time allocation with 
learning only, incumbent reaction only, and both learning and incumbent reaction; this will distinguish 
these three cases from the base case, for which the superscript ‘*’ is used. We first examine the 
entrepreneur’s time allocation decision in the base case (all proofs are given in the Appendix.)  
A. Base Case (Benchmark) 
In this case, buyers make decisions based only on the time allocated to them by the entrepreneur. The TAP 
therefore becomes  
                                              .)()(=max 1211
1
nNRnRE
n
E                             (1) 
The next result characterizes the optimal allocation strategy. 
Proposition 1. The entrepreneur’s unique optimal time allocation 
*
1n  to Buyer 1 satisfies the following 
equality (where )(  is the first derivative of )( ):  
                                                 ).(=)( 1
1
2
1
1
1 nN
nN
R
n
n
R


                                               (2) 
The dotted curve in Fig. 3 plots the optimal proportion of time invested in Buyer 1 (n1
*/N) as a function of 
the ratio R1/R2 on a logarithmic scale. The curve confirms our intuition that more time should be allocated to 
the buyer who represents greater revenue. The curve is symmetric around 𝑅1/𝑅2  = 1, with exactly half of 
the time being given to each of Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 if 𝑅1 = 𝑅2 . This follows from Eq. (2): an increase in 
𝑅1 increases the left-hand side of Eq. (2), leading to a larger 
*
1n , while an increase in 𝑅2 increases the right-
hand side of Eq. (2), leading to a smaller 
*
1n .  
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B. Consumer Peer Learning (Case L) 
In the presence of consumer peer learning, the likelihood of Buyer 2 purchasing the entrepreneur’s product 
also depends on Buyer 1’s decision. This is because Buyer 1’s purchase provides assurance to Buyer 2 
regarding Buyer 2’s uncertainty about the product’s quality, in essence acting as “free advertising.” 
Considering this dynamic, the entrepreneur’s TAP becomes: 
      )())()(()()(=max 11121211
1
nnNNRnNRnRE
n
E    (3) 
In contrast to the base case, as described in Eq. (1), the entrepreneur must now consider the additional term 
0)())()(( 112  nnNNR . The expression ))()(( 1nNN   describes the 
increase in Buyer 2’s probability of purchasing that results from Buyer 1’s purchase. Thus, the entrepreneur’s 
effective revenue from convincing Buyer 1 amounts to  
)).()(( 121 nNNRR 1  
The effective revenue comprises 
1R , the direct revenue from Buyer 1, and ))()(( 12 nNNR  , 
the indirect revenue from Buyer 2 achieved through peer learning. Absent peer learning, Buyer 2 would glean 
no information from Buyer 1’s purchase and so the indirect revenue term would disappear, which would 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Effect of consumer peer learning. Optimal % time spent on Buyer 1 plotted as a function of R1/R2 on a log scale for 
case L (solid curve) and base case (dotted curve). Parameters: N=200, γ=5, λ=4.85, σ=2.25, 𝑅1 ∈ [50,200], 𝑅2 = 100. 
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reduce Eq. (3) to the base case of Eq. (1). The effective revenue from Buyer 1 ( 1 ) increases with the 
entrepreneur’s allocated time ( 1n ). 
The next result formalizes how consumer peer learning influences the entrepreneur’s sales strategy. 
Proposition 2. The optimal time allocation to Buyer 1 under consumer peer learning, ,
L*
1n  is greater than 
or equal to n1
*. Moreover, n1
*L satisfies the following equality:  
                                 .
)())(/(
)(1
=
)(1
)(1
121
1
11
1
1 nNNRR
nN
nNn
n
n 




                              (4) 
The solid curve in Fig. 3 plots the optimal proportion of time allocated to Buyer 1 (n1
*L/N) as a function 
of  the revenue ratio R1/R2 in the presence of consumer peer learning. Compared to the base case (the dotted 
curve), the optimal proportion of time to invest in Buyer 1 is significantly higher (around 90%) because 
Buyer 1 represents more revenue when there is consumer peer learning than when there is not (i.e., 
1R1 ).  
The entrepreneur should allocate more time to Buyer 1 than Buyer 2 even if 21 < RR . In fact, one can 
observe from the right-hand side of Eq. (4) that the entrepreneur may want to allocate more time to Buyer 1 
than Buyer 2 even if 0<1R .
3 This represents the case of the entrepreneur investing time to convince Buyer 
1 and paying for Buyer 1’s endorsement. 
C. Incumbent Reaction (Case R) 
Recall that the incumbent may react by providing an additional benefit ik  to Buyer i. By providing this 
benefit, the incumbent alters the superiority of the entrepreneur’s product for Buyer i to 
.)]/([:=)(  ii kk   Note that this expression is decreasing in i
k , i.e., a stronger incumbent reaction 
 
3 From the right-hand side of Eq. (4), because 0)()( 1  nNN , it follows that the entrepreneur should invest time to seek Buyer 1’s 
endorsement as long as R1/R2 is not strongly negative. 
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makes it more difficult for the entrepreneur to acquire buyers. We will use the notation )( ik  to make this 
dependence explicit where appropriate.  
Applying the principle of backward induction, we first examine the incumbent reaction problem (IRP),  
                           ))((1))((1=max 112111
1
nNkKRnkRE
k
I  .                                   (5) 
The incumbent’s optimal strategy is formalized next. 
Lemma 1. Given the entrepreneur’s time allocation strategy, the incumbent’s optimal strategy is    


 
,0
);(/
= 1
R
21*
1
otherwise
nRRifK
k  
.
)(0)())((
)(0)())((
)(
11
11
1
R
nnK
nNnNK
nwhere


  
Lemma 1 states that it is optimal for the incumbent to adopt an all-or-nothing approach, i.e., to dedicate all 
its resources K to either Buyer 1 or Buyer 2, depending on whether or not the ratio 𝑅1/𝑅2 is above a threshold 
)( 1
R n , which depends on the entrepreneur’s time allocation. Specifically, the numerator of )( 1
R n  
represents the increase in the incumbent’s chance of retaining Buyer 2 when all its resources are dedicated 
to Buyer 2, and the denominator of )( 1
R n represents the increase in the incumbent’s chance of retaining 
Buyer 1 when all its resources are dedicated to Buyer 1. Therefore, if )(/ 1
R
21 nRR  , then dedicating all 
resources to Buyer 1 is more beneficial than dedicating all to Buyer 2. 
    The next result formalizes how the incumbent’s reaction influences the entrepreneur’s optimal sales 
strategy. 
Proposition 3 . The optimal time allocation to Buyer 1 under the incumbent’s reaction, n1*R, is less than 
n1
* if and only if 𝑅1/𝑅2 > 1.  
Proposition 3 shows that in the presence of incumbent reaction, the entrepreneur should always focus on the 
buyer representing smaller revenue; this is because the incumbent will always focus its resources on retaining 
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the buyer representing larger revenue. In other words, the entrepreneur should refrain from directly 
competing with the incumbent. The reason is that it is easier for the incumbent to retain an existing buyer 
than for the entrepreneur to acquire a new one. To see this, suppose the entrepreneur wants to maintain Buyer 
1’s probability of purchasing at  , i.e., =))(( 11 nk  . The expression inside the parentheses is linear 
in 1k but involves the square root of n1. So if the incumbent allocates K to Buyer 1, then the entrepreneur 
must allocate significantly more of its limited time to 1n  simply to remain competitive. But without a clear 
assurance of acquiring Buyer 1, it is clearly inefficient to sacrifice Buyer 2. This finding is similar in spirit 
to a finding in [41], which argues that new entrants perform better when they avoid triggering countermoves 
by large rivals.  
The solid curve in Fig. 4 plots the optimal proportion of time allocated to Buyer 1 (n1
*R/N) as a function 
of the ratio 𝑅1/𝑅2 in the presence of incumbent reaction. Compared to the base case (dotted curve), there is 
a discontinuous drop at 𝑅1/𝑅2  = 1, which represents the equilibrium ratio: the ratio 1
R   represents the 
point where the incumbent is indifferent between dedicating resources to Buyer 1 or to Buyer 2, and when 
𝑅1 = 𝑅2, as shown in the base case, the entrepreneur should allocate time equally between the two buyers 
(𝑛𝑅 = 𝑁 − 𝑛𝑅). When 21 < RR , the incumbent prefers to allocate all its resources to retain Buyer 2; hence the 
entrepreneur should avoid Buyer 2 and increase the sales time allocated to Buyer 1 compared to the base 
case. Conversely, if 21 > RR , then the incumbent will instead put all its sales resources into retaining Buyer 
1; in this case, the entrepreneur should increase the sales time it allocates to Buyer 2, which would yield a 
higher return on the entrepreneur’s time. 
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D. Interaction of Consumer Peer Learning and Incumbent Reaction (Case LR) 
We now examine the interaction of the two effects of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction. 
Again, following the principle of backward induction, we first examine the incumbent’s reaction problem in 
the presence of consumer peer learning, which is now: 
))(()))-K(((1)))(((1=max 1112111
1
nkNkRnkRE
k
I                              
                                      )))(((1)))(((1 11112 nknNkKR  .                                  (6) 
 The incumbent’s best response is formalized next. 
Lemma 2. Given the entrepreneur’s time allocation strategy ,1n  the incumbent’s optimal strategy is 


 
,0
);(/
= 1
LR
21*
1
otherwise
nRRifK
k  
    where  1)( 1
LR  n . 
We refer readers to Eq. (A.2) in the appendix for the expression of )( 1
LR n . The influence of consumer 
peer influence on the incumbent’s reaction is reflected in the strict inequality 1RLR  . This implies 
that the incumbent is willing to dedicate all its resources to Buyer 1 even if this buyer represents smaller 
 
Fig. 4.  Effect of incumbent reaction. Optimal % time spent on Buyer 1 plotted as a function of R1/R2 on a log scale for case R 
(solid curve) and base case (dotted curve). Parameters: N=200, γ=5, λ=4.85, σ=2.25, K=0.1, 𝑅1 ∈ [50,200], 𝑅2 = 100. 
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revenue than Buyer 2 (
2RR 1 ), because consumer peer learning increases the effective revenue from 
Buyer 1 (
1R1 ).  
We next characterize how consumer peer learning and the incumbent’s reaction interact to influence the 
entrepreneur’s time allocation decision.  
Proposition 4.  There exists 1*LR  such that  
        (i) 
L*
1
LR*
1 nn   if and only if 
*LR
21/ RR , and  
        (ii) 
R*
1
LR*
1 nn   if 
*LR
21/ RR or R1/R2>1.  
Part (i) of Proposition 4 shows the marginal impact of the incumbent’s reaction in the presence of peer 
learning. This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 5. The optimal proportion of time invested in Buyer 1 
in the presence of both consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction (case LR, solid curve) and with only 
consumer peer learning (case R, dash-dot curve) are plotted with respect to 𝑅1/𝑅2 on a logarithmic scale. 
Recall that in case L (the dotted curve), it is optimal for the entrepreneur to invest a significant proportion 
(around 90%) of its time in the influential Buyer 1 due to the effect of consumer peer learning. Relative to 
this benchmark, the presence of incumbent reaction encourages the entrepreneur to avoid directly competing 
with the incumbent, similar to Proposition 3.  However, observe that avoiding direct competition with the 
incumbent no longer means that the entrepreneur should focus on the smaller buyer. The incumbent now 
seeks to retain the influential Buyer 1 in order to take advantage of free advertising even if it represents 
smaller revenue (𝑅1 < 𝑅2). Thus, the entrepreneur can avoid competition for Buyer 1 only when it represents 
significantly smaller revenue (𝑅1/𝑅2 < 0.8). 
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 shows the marginal impact of consumer peer learning in the presence of 
incumbent reaction. Recall that in Proposition 2, the presence of consumer peer learning always encourages 
the entrepreneur to invest more selling time in the influential Buyer 1. We find that this is no longer the case 
in the presence of incumbent reaction. This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5. Specifically, compared 
to case R (the dotted curve), when consumer peer learning is introduced, the entrepreneur should invest more 
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time in the influential buyer only when 𝑅1/𝑅2is either low (𝑅1/𝑅2 < 0.8) or high (𝑅1/𝑅2 > 1); for the 
intermediate range (0.8,1)/ 21 RR , the entrepreneur should instead decrease the sales time allocated to the 
influential Buyer 1.  
 
 When Buyer 1 represents relatively small revenue (𝑅1/𝑅2 < 0.8), even its influential status does not make 
it attractive for the incumbent. In this case, the entrepreneur should maximize its chance of acquiring Buyer 
1 by allocating even more time to Buyer 1 (close to 100%). If the influential Buyer 1 represents higher 
revenue (𝑅1/𝑅2 > 1 ), the incumbent will want to retain Buyer 1. In this case, it is desirable for the 
entrepreneur to increase its sales effort directed to the influential Buyer 1 to target higher revenue and to take 
advantage of Buyer 1’s influence. When the influential buyer has neither low nor higher revenue potential, 
the incumbent firm will react to retain the influential buyer to take advantage of consumer peer learning. For 
the entrepreneur, due to Buyer 1’s relatively lower revenue compared to Buyer 2 and the need to avoid 
competing with the incumbent, it is desirable to divert sales effort from the influential Buyer 1 to the non-
influential Buyer with slightly higher revenue potential.         
V. DISCUSSION 
Our research has implications for both theory and practice. Our research focuses on the market entry 
strategy and challenges faced by entrepreneurial firms. While extant research on new product market entry 
 
Fig. 5.  Interaction (marginal) effect of consumer peer learning (right panel) and incumbent reaction (left panel). Optimal % 
time spent on Buyer 1 plotted as a function of R1/R2 on a log scale for case LR (solid curve), with case L (dash-dot curve) [left 
panel] and case R (dotted curve) [right panel]. Parameters: N=200, γ=5, λ=4.85, σ=2.25, K=0.1, 𝑅1 ∈ [50,200], 𝑅2 = 100. 
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strategies has largely examined the setting of large established firms and the performance implications of 
various competitive moves [51, 52], the entrepreneurial firm setting requires a different focus on two fronts. 
First, entrepreneurial firms lack the resources, reputation, and routines of established firms [8], so their 
market entry will necessarily avoid moves that will require substantial economies of scale or experience 
curves [53-55]. Therefore, competitive moves between new entrepreneurial ventures and large firms are 
asymmetric [41, 56].  Second, a key notion in recent work on entrepreneurs in established markets has been 
their uphill battle against incumbents whose resources help them ‘maintain dominance’. Entrepreneurs must 
be flexible in their entry in order to work around established rivals [41]. Thus, how entrepreneurs make their 
tactical-level decisions to manage their shortages in the face of opportunities/threats determines the size of 
their realized opportunity.  
Building on this perspective, we examine the asymmetric customer acquisition versus retention setting 
between a technology entrepreneur and the incumbent, and we focus on the more granular operational-level 
decision regarding how entrepreneurs should allocate their limited selling time. Our results demonstrate that 
tactical-level decisions require understanding the nuances of the market dynamics and their interactions. For 
example, entrepreneurs should avoid competing directly with the incumbent for a customer segment, unless 
that segment represents both influential and large revenue. Furthermore, knowing whether or not an 
incumbent firm will react to the entrepreneur’s entry has implications for the entrepreneur’s tactical decisions. 
Thus, being knowledgeable about the incumbent is a key asset for entrepreneurs.  
Our study also provides insights into consumer peer learning during new product sales. Previous research 
has predominantly suggested focusing first on people with a disproportional effect on others, often labeled 
“opinion leaders” or “influencers” [57, 58]. The idea is that convincing opinion leaders early in the sales 
process will help accelerate the adoption and usage of the product in the larger population. Our results, 
however, point to a more complex dynamic in which targeting the less influential customer may be the 
entrepreneur’s optimal tactical move. 
 Because tactical-level decisions made by entrepreneurs are hard to observe empirically, previous research 
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has made use of novel methods such as experiential simulations [41]. In our study, we employ a mathematical 
model. Mathematical models can be effective tools for building new theories of entrepreneurship because 
they can facilitate the articulation of assumptions and relationships among variables, while their optimal 
solutions provide a platform for developing testable hypotheses [59]. In this regard, our model can provide a 
platform for examining whether some uncertainty between sales effort and sales success can be explained by 
whether or not time has been allocated properly, depending on the different market dynamics. 
 
The results of our analysis of the four cases naturally map into a practical rule of thumb (illustrated in 
Figure 6) that technology entrepreneurs can use for their market entry. Specifically, they can determine which 
of the nine cases (presence or absence of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction, along with the 
revenue distribution of the buyers) matches their context most closely and focus their time on the buyer 
represented by the shaded portion of each pie. In the base case (lower right quadrant of the figure), it is 
 
Fig. 6. The entrepreneur’s time allocation strategy, depending on nine different market structures. The pie segments denoted as 
𝑅1 and 𝑅2 show the relative size of revenues from the influential buyer (Buyer 1) and the other buyer (Buyer 2), respectively. 
Shaded pie segments correspond to the recommended selling focus for entrepreneurs. 
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preferable to focus more on the buyer that represents greater revenue. For the case with consumer peer 
learning only (upper right quadrant), it is preferable to focus more on the influential buyer even if this buyer 
represents less revenue. This can be seen by comparing Case 5 and Case 9. Entrepreneurs who exploit 
consumer peer learning increase their potential total revenue, and for a given market size the case with 
consumer peer learning is more promising than the one without. 
In the case with incumbent reaction only (lower left), it is preferable to focus on the buyer that the 
incumbent would be least interested in. With a limited consumer peer learning effect, the incumbent pays 
more attention to the buyer who represents greater revenue; hence the entrepreneur should focus on selling 
to the buyer representing smaller revenue. The contrast with the prescriptions of the base case is seen by 
comparing Case 6 and Case 8 (or equivalently, Case 7 and Case 9). An entrepreneur can improve the return 
on its time by forgoing (or at least minimizing) direct competition with a reactive incumbent. For a given 
market size, the case featuring incumbent reaction will be less attractive than the alternatives. 
Finally, when both consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction are in play (upper left quadrant), the 
decision is nuanced. If the more influential Buyer 1 represents a large portion of the market revenue (Case 
1), then the entrepreneur should focus on Buyer 1 despite the competition with the incumbent because the 
level of influence and high revenue is sufficiently attractive. If the influential Buyer 1 represents a small 
portion of the market revenue (Case 3), then the entrepreneur should again focus on Buyer 1 to avoid direct 
competition with the incumbent (who now focuses on retaining Buyer 2) and to benefit from the potential 
“free advertising” to Buyer 2 provided by Buyer 1’s purchase. If the influential Buyer 1 represents a slightly 
smaller portion of market revenue (Case 2), then the entrepreneur should focus on Buyer 2 to target a larger 
revenue and avoid competing with the incumbent for Buyer 1. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
    Our paper investigates the complex factors that should be considered by technology entrepreneurs seeking 
to allocate time among potential buyers when entering an established market with a superior product 
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substitute. Because the entrepreneur offers a product that is truly superior to that of the incumbent, it might 
seem that it would only be a matter of time before the entrepreneur conquers the market. To do this, however, 
entrepreneurs must recognize and tactfully manage their shortages (in resources, reputation, and routines) to 
navigate through various threats and opportunities presented in the market. Equipped with a superior 
technology-based product, their goal in the early phase is to create initial sales. The first step in the technology 
entrepreneur’s sales plan is identification of which potential customers should be approached first, and how. 
The research reported here addresses these questions by considering two major opportunities/threats found 
in many entrepreneurial market entry situations: the effect of influential customers on other potential 
customers and the incumbent’s reaction to defend its market share. 
This study offers economic insights into operational entrepreneurship, or “the selection and management 
of transformation processes for recognizing, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities for potential value 
creation” [60]. Specifically, focusing on the management of entrepreneurial selling—which is, in essence, a 
process of transforming the organizational resource of time into actual sales—allows us to derive important 
insights into how entrepreneurs can efficiently exploit opportunities. Finally, our study focuses on the market 
entry of small entrepreneurial firms, so we identify the maximization of short-term sales as a primary 
objective. We are thus mainly interested in the short-term decisions of entrepreneurs and incumbents, and we 
focus in particular on tactical levers such as time allocation. As such, we hope that our results will enrich the 
existing literature on technology entrepreneurship.  
Lastly, a fundamental question in entrepreneurship is: why are some entrepreneurs successful and others 
not [61]? While there exist many explanations attributing entrepreneurial success to the entrepreneur’s 
psychological, social, and educational backgrounds, among other factors, we provide a different rationale 
based on tactical-level decisions made by entrepreneurs. Other tactical-level decisions based on time 
allocation such as developing supplier relations or investor relations may be fruitful directions for future 
research. 
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The simplicity of our model necessarily involves some limitations. First, our model is stylized with the 
market consisting of two buyers. A fruitful extension would be to accommodate more general consumer 
network structures, for example, the complete network assumed by [11]. We also do not model the possibility 
of consumers obtaining information from different channels, e.g. third party reviews. Furthermore, the model 
incorporates neither cognitive decision “inertia” nor organisational hurdles—each of which could, in practice, 
affect a purchase decision. Finally, we only consider the entrepreneur’s competition with the incumbent but 
not the case of multiple entrepreneurs competing amongst themselves. It would be worthwhile to examine 
how the insights of this paper would change as these assumptions are relaxed, which we leave for future 
research. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking the first derivative of Eq. (1) with respect to 1n yields the first-order 
condition (FOC)—namely, Eq. (2). It is easy to verify that the left-hand side (LHS) of Eq. (2) decreases in 
1n  and that the RHS of Eq. (2) increases in 1n . Hence there exists a unique solution, 
*
1n . □  
Proof of Proposition 2: Taking the first derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to 
1n  yields the FOC, which is 
Eq. (4). Recall that the LHS of Eq. (4) contains the hazard function of the standard normal distribution, a 
function that is increasing in its argument. Now taking the first derivative of the LHS with respect to ,1n  
we obtain the term  
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as well as the inequality  
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Inequality (A.1) can be proved as follows. The first derivative of its LHS with respect to 1n  is  
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and, according to Assumption 1(i), 10 1  n . Hence the maximum of that derivative is achieved when 
1=1n , and this maximum is negative: 0<)
1
1
(1
(1)1
(1)


 . So (A.1) holds. The LHS of Eq. (4) is therefore 
decreasing in 1n , thus also decreasing in 1n . 
Similarly, we take the first derivative with respect to 1nN   for the RHS of Eq. (4) and then follow the 
same steps to show that this RHS is decreasing in 1nN   and hence increasing in 1n . We conclude that 
there must exist a unique solution, ,
L*
1n  to Eq. (4).  
Next, we reformulate Eq. (4) as follows:  
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Now dividing both sides of Eq. (2) by 1R  yields  
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Comparing the FOCs that we derived for cases of learning, Eq.(4) and no learning, Eq.(2) reveals that 
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Therefore,  .
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 Thus the RHS of Eq. (4) is always smaller than that of Eq. 
(2), from which it follows that 
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Proof of Lemma 1: To prove this lemma, we first start with the following lemma: 
 Lemma A.1. The incumbent firm’s expected revenue is convex in .1k   
 Proof of Lemma A.1: This lemma is a special case of Lemma A.2, whose proof is given in the proof of 
Lemma 2. □ 
Lemma A.1 shows that the maximum revenue is achieved either at Kk =1  or .0=1k  If the incumbent 
puts Kk =1 , then its expected revenue is );()(=)=( 12111 nNRn
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Proof of Proposition 3: Focusing on the decision variable 1n , Lemma 1 gives the valuation threshold 
)( 1
R n , that determines when the entrepreneur switches from one buyer to the other. In the same way, by 
considering 2n as the decision variable instead of 1n , the corresponding )( 2
R n  should equal )( 1
R n  in 
equilibrium due to symmetry between the two buyers, namley )()( 1
R
2
R nn  . Note that, by applying 
Lemma 1,  
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Therefore, in equilibrium, .1*R   
Given the incumbent’s best strategy 
*
1k in Lemma 1, the entrepreneur’s optimal time allocation 
Rn*1 can be 
solved by following the same steps as in Proposition 1. In equilibrium, if the incumbent focuses on Buyer 1 
(i.e., Kk =
*
1 , when 1/
*R
21 RR ) then we know that—as compared with the base case— )( 1k  decreases 
and )( 2k  increases. We can therefore use the fact that 
*
1n   is increasing in )(  to obtain 
*
1
R*
1 < nn . 
Analogously, if the incumbent focuses on Buyer 2 in the equilibrium and so 0=
*
1k , we know that )( 1k  
increases and )( 2k  decreases relative to the base case; hence 
*
1
R*
1 > nn . □   
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove this proposition, we first start with the following lemma: 
Lemma A.2. In the presence of consumer peer learning, the incumbent firm’s expected revenue 
IE  is 
convex in .1k   
Proof of Lemma A.2: We show that, under Assumption 1, the second derivative of the incumbent’s 
function with respect to 1k  is positive. We start by taking the first derivative of Eq. (6) with respect to 1k , 
which yields the following FOC:   
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    Next we show that LHS and RHS of this FOC are, respectively, increasing and decreasing in 1k . We first 
focus on the LHS. Since  <K  and since )
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 is increasing in 1k , it follows that the 
LHS is also increasing in 1k  only if  
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from which it follows that .
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With regard to the RHS, it is easy to verify that )
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are both decreasing in 1k . Therefore, RHS decreases with 1k  only if  
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Therefore, a sufficient condition for a positive second derivative is  
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The implications hold because 
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; here the first and second 
inequalities follow from parts (i) and (ii), respectively, of Assumption 1.□ 
Lemma A.2 shows that the maximum revenue is achieved either at either Kk =1  or 0=1k , and its 
expected revenue under that choice is (respectively):  
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    Solving for 21/RR  such that 0)=(=)=( 11 kEKkE II  , we obtain the threshold  
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    Comparing with Case R, in Case LR with consumer peer learning, the effective revenue from Buyer 1,  
                                                   .))()(( 1121 RnNNRR 1  
By replacing 
1R with 1 , the valuation threshold for 2/ R1 is equal to 
R , therefore, the valuation 
threshold for 
2/ RR1 , .1
RLR  □ 
Proof of Proposition 4: Proving part (i) is similar to Proposition 3, thus is omitted here. For part (ii), we 
know from Proposition 2 that, given a fixed ik , the entrepreneur always allocates more time to Buyer 1 in 
the presence of consumer peer learning. So unless the incumbent changes its focus, the entrepreneur focuses 
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on Buyer 1 when there is consumer peer learning. As a result, 0)=(>0)=( 1
R*
11
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1 knkn  and 
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1 KknKkn , when 
LR
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